Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 12
Issue 1
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES I:
Papers on Toxicology and Epidemiology

Article 6

2003

A Problem of "Virtual" Proportions: The
Difficulties Inherent in Tailoring Virtual Child
Pornography Laws to Meet Constitutional
Standards
Jasmin J. Farhangian

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Jasmin J. Farhangian, A Problem of "Virtual" Proportions: The Difficulties Inherent in Tailoring Virtual Child Pornography Laws to Meet
Constitutional Standards, 12 J. L. & Pol'y (2003).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol12/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

FARHANGIAN.DOC

3/3/2004 1:45 PM

A PROBLEM OF “VIRTUAL” PROPORTIONS:
THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN
TAILORING VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS TO MEET
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Jasmin J. Farhangian*
The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought.
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1
It is only through computer systems and the mail that child
pornography exists today.
—Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions2

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., New York University, 2000.
The author is grateful to her family and friends for their invaluable
encouragement and support. She owes a special thank you to her parents for
serving as a constant source of inspiration.
1
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (noting the
danger posed to the First Amendment when the Government “seeks to control
thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end”).
2
United States Senator Jeff Sessions Press Release, (Sept. 16, 2002),
available at http://sessions.senate.gov/headlines/child.htm (stating Alabama
Senator Jeff Sessions’ support for the 2002 anti-child pornography bill).
Sessions states that child pornography laws to date have been hugely successful
in eliminating child pornography from bookstores. Id. He alludes to the fact that
efforts should be focused on enacting legislation to serve as the basis for
prosecuting individuals who perpetuate child pornography on the Internet. See
id.
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INTRODUCTION
A defendant stands before the court to challenge his conviction
for possession of child pornography.3 The government points to
images of child pornography found on the defendant’s computer
hard drive. The defendant asserts that this evidence should not
form the basis for a conviction since the images do not depict real
children at all. Rather, he asserts that the images are computer
generated. Furthermore, he insists that the government prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are real.
Concern by the United States Government over the realization
of this exact scenario helped form the basis for proposed
legislation titled the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention
Act of 2002 (COPPA of 2002)4 and the Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003 (COPPA of 2003).5 The
COPPA of 2002 and 2003 were never enacted into law but the
Senate ultimately incorporated the virtual child pornography
prohibitions contained in the COPPA of 2002 and 2003 into the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of

3

See infra note 51 (citing numerous state statutes which criminalize child
pornography). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (finding
that New York state statute prohibiting the dissemination of child pornography
was not substantially overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment).
4
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002) (entitled, “An act to prevent
trafficking in child pornography and obscenity, to proscribe pandering and
solicitation relating to visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit
conduct, to prevent the use of child pornography and obscenity to facilitate
crimes against children, and for other purposes”). The bill was passed by the
House in June 2002 and referred to the Senate on June 26, 2002. See id. The
COPPA of 2002 was struck down in the Senate in February 2003. See id.
Following its demise in the Senate, the House proposed the Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003. See H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003).
5
H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). The 2003 bill retains the same title as the
COPPA of 2002, namely, “An act to prevent trafficking in child pornography
and obscenity, to proscribe pandering and solicitation relating to visual
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, to prevent the use of
child pornography and obscenity to facilitate crimes against children, and for
other purposes.” Id.
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Children Today Act (PROTECT Act),6 which was signed into law
by President Bush on April 30, 2003.7
The COPPA of 2002 and 2003 and the PROTECT Act were a
direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,8 in which the Court held unconstitutional two
provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA), one of which placed a ban on “virtual” child
pornography.9 The legislation, proposed by Attorney General John
Ashcroft, attempted to rectify the problems with the CPPA by
tailoring virtual child pornography laws to meet constitutional
standards.10 Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas, the bill’s
sponsor, stated that Congress tried to respond to the specific
objections voiced by the individual Supreme Court justices in
Ashcroft and that he was confident that the COPPA of 2002 would
6

18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003); S. 151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (titled, “A
Bill to Amend Title 18, United States Code, With Respect to the Sexual
Exploitation of Children”).
7
See Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of
the Protect Act, 21-SUM ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3, 4 (2003) (stating that
differences between the COPPA and the Senate version of this bill led to the
enactment of the PROTECT Act).
8
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
9
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)-(C) (2003). The CPPA defines “child
pornography” as:
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually
explicit conduct, where: (A) the production of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B)
such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computergenerated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has
been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. The second provision, which all nine justices agreed violates the First
Amendment, proscribes visual depictions which “convey the impression” that
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 257-88
(2002).
10
See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
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pass constitutional muster.11 Congressman Smith felt equally
strong about the constitutionality of the COPPA of 2003, which he
also sponsored.12
This note addresses the constitutionality of the recent attempts
to proscribe virtual child pornography, particularly as they face
first amendment challenges the CPPA failed to survive. Part I
describes virtual child pornography and discusses the development
of virtual child pornography law. Part II discusses the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ashcroft, focusing on the government’s reasons
for asserting the necessity of a ban on virtual child pornography.
Part III explores the ways in which legislation proscribing virtual
child pornography responds to the government’s concerns and
introduces the newly-passed ban on virtual child pornography in
the PROTECT Act. Part IV argues that any attempt to ban virtual
child pornography will prove unsuccessful against a First
Amendment challenge. Part V proposes that the government focus
its resources on prosecuting offenders of child pornography who
utilize technology to create computer-generated images of children
rather than on attempting to pass constitutionally faulty legislation.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
LAW
It is well established that the First Amendment does not protect
pornography that involves real children.13 Because child
11

Julia Scheeres, House Refines Virtual Porn Ban, WIRED NEWS, (Jun. 27,
2002), available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53510, 00.htm.
12
See Congressman Lamar Smith Press Release, Smith Bill to Fight Child
Pornography Passes House, (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://lamarsmith.
house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=210. “If this legislation becomes
law, child pornographers will be deterred, or prosecuted.” Id.
13
See U.S. CONST. Amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent
part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .” Id. Although the First Amendment was originally construed to
protect political and social speech, the Court has consistently held that the First
Amendment also protects artistic and other types of speech, even if of a sexual
nature. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)
(holding that nude dancing, as a form of expression, is within the purview of
protected free speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
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pornography is not entitled to constitutional protection, legislation
that proscribes its creation, possession and distribution is
permissible.14 Virtual child pornography, however, creates a
unique problem in that it involves the creation of pornography
without the use of actual, live children.15 Computers have
transformed the creation of child pornography into a realm not
covered by existing law.16
A technique known as “morphing” allows a non-obscene
image, such as a photograph of a real child scanned into a
computer, to be transformed into an image of a child engaging in
sexually
explicit
conduct.17
Morphing,
short
for
“metamorphosing,” is a technique through which a computer fills
in the blanks between dissimilar objects to create a combined
image.18 For example, through graphics software, an individual can
combine the image of a child’s face with that of an adult’s body,
erase pubic hair and reduce breast or genital size to create a portrait

(1952) (holding that motion pictures, despite being made for commercial
motives, are protected by the First Amendment); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948) (holding that the distinction between informative speech and
speech for entertainment purposes is “too elusive” to deny entertaining
expression constitutional protection); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1990) (allowing states to penalize persons possessing and viewing child
pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (providing that
child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection so long as the
prohibited conduct is adequately defined by state law).
14
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (holding that the state has an interest in
prohibiting images that are the product of child sexual abuse, regardless of their
content).
15
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)
(distinguishing real child pornography from virtual child pornography and
explaining why prohibitions on the latter presents a First Amendment problem).
16
See Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography:
A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439 (1997) (describing
techniques utilized to create virtual child pornography). Advancements in
technology, specifically through the use of computers, allow for individuals to
create visual images that do not consist of images of minors. Id.
17
Id. at 440-41.
18
Id. at 440 n.5. See Jeff Prosise, Morphing: Magic on Your PC, PC MAG.,
June 14, 1994, at 325 (explaining morphing technology).
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of child pornography that appears genuine.19 In fact, this
technology allows an individual to create a computer-generated
child from adult pornography images.20 The image of a Playboy
centerfold can be scanned into a computer at very little expense
and then altered through the use of morphing technology to create
a visual depiction that appears to be of a nude child.21
Virtual child pornography falls outside the parameters of
existing child pornography law because it functions through the
use of artistic and computer skills to create animated depictions
resembling real children.22 The law with respect to child
pornography has undergone many changes to meet the continuing
challenges of child pornography itself.23 In reviewing real child
pornography laws, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that real
child pornography does not warrant First Amendment protection.24
The Court recently had the opportunity to address the
constitutionality of prohibitions on virtual child pornography and,
despite its declaration that such prohibitions violate the First
Amendment, the legislature continues to enact proscriptions
against virtual child pornography.25
A. The Supreme Court
From the early 1970s the Supreme Court has struggled with
19

Burke, supra note 16, at 472 n.8.
Id. at 440.
21
Id.
22
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (stating that materials
or depictions of sexual conduct “which do not involve live performance or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances,” retain First
Amendment protection); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 109293 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that virtually-created child pornography cannot be
suppressed simply because it involves “foul figments of creative technology”
that do not involve actual children).
23
See supra Part I.B (discussing early legislation and amendments to deal
with the widespread problem of child pornography).
24
See supra Part I.A (detailing the Supreme Court’s holdings when
analyzing real child pornography laws).
25
S. 151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
20
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defining permissible limitations on pornography.26 In Miller v.
California, the Supreme Court provided examples of visual images
that states may incorporate into statutes when defining obscenity.27
For example, a state could regulate “patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated, or patently offensive representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd
exhibition of genitals.”28
Almost ten years later, in New York v. Ferber, the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of the states’ freedom to suppress
material portraying sexual acts or lewd displays of genitalia of
children.29 The Ferber Court ultimately held that the First
Amendment does not extend protection to persons who sell,
26

See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.103 (1990); Ferber, 458 U.S. 747;
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
27
413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973). The defendant in Miller conducted a mass
mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books categorized as “adult
material.” Id. at 16. His conviction was specifically based on his conduct in
causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail
addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. Id. The envelope was
opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother who did not request the
brochures and who subsequently complained to the police. Id. Defendant was
convicted by a jury for violating California Penal Code section 311.2(a) by
knowingly distributing obscene matter. Id. The Supreme Court held that obscene
materials may properly be regulated by the state. Id. The Court defined
obscenity as works which “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex,” which “portray, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law” and which “taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Id. at 24.
28
Id. at 25.
29
458 U.S. 747 (1982). Ferber involved a Bookstore proprietor convicted
under a New York statute prohibiting individuals from “knowingly promoting a
sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by distributing material which
depicted such a performance.” Id. He appealed his conviction and the Appellate
Division affirmed. Id. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, his
conviction was reversed based on a finding that the New York statute under
which Ferber was convicted was both underinclusive and overbroad and, as a
result, violated the First Amendment. 52 N.Y.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1981). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that child pornography
is not protected by the First Amendment and that the New York statute was
neither overbroad nor underinclusive. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
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advertise or otherwise disseminate child pornography.30 The
Ferber Court rejected the First Amendment challenge, holding that
“[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”31 In the first sentence of
the Ferber decision, the Court observed that “[i]n recent years, the
exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has
become a serious national problem.”32 The Court, in so expressing
its concern over the children harmed in the production of child
pornography, indicated that regulation of child pornography
warranted different treatment than regulation of adult
pornography.33 A noteworthy result of Ferber was the Court’s
holding that all child pornography that depicted actual children
may be prohibited, regardless of whether it was “obscene.”34
Subsequently, in Osborne v. Ohio, the Court addressed the
issue of whether an individual may possess child pornography
privately in his home.35 The Court applied the standards from
30

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
Id. at 759.
32
Id. at 749. See also S. REP. 95-438, at 43 (1977). Legislative findings in
1977 revealed that, “because of the vast potential profits involved, it would
appear that [the child pornography] enterprise is growing at a rapid rate.” Id.
One researcher . . . has documented the existence of over 260 different
magazines which depict children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Such magazines depict children, some as young as three to five years of
age, in couplings with their peers of the same or opposite sex, or with
adult men and women. The activities featured range from lewd poses to
intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, incest and sadomasochism. Such magazines . . . are only one of the forms of child
pornography that are currently available in the United States. Other
forms include ten to twelve minute films known as ‘loops,’ still
photographs, slides, playing cards and video cassettes.
Id.
33
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
34
Id. at 764-65. See supra note 29 (discussing the facts and holding of the
Ferber opinion).
35
495 U.S. 103 (1990). In Osborne, Ohio police found photographs in
Osborne’s home, each of which depicted a nude male adolescent posed in a
sexually explicit position. Id. Osborne was convicted of violating a state statute
31
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Ferber, reasoning that the First Amendment similarly does not
extend protection to the private possession of child pornography.36
According to the Osborne Court, the state could prohibit the
possession and viewing of these materials because doing so would
further the state’s compelling interest in “protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the
market for the exploitative use of children.”37
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,38 decided nearly three
decades after the Supreme Court first addressed obscenity in
Miller, provided the Court with its first opportunity to address
legislation prohibiting virtual child pornography.39 The Free
Speech Coalition and others originally challenged the CPPA of
1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

prohibiting a person from possessing or viewing any material or performance
showing a minor (who was not his child or ward) in a state of nudity, unless the
material was presented for a bona fide purpose by or to a person having a proper
interest in such materials, or the possessor knew that the minor’s parents or
guardian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor. Id.
Osborne contended that the First Amendment prohibited the States from
proscribing the private possession of child pornography. Id.
36
Id. at 139.
37
Id. at 103.
38
535 U.S. 234 (2002). In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the
portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) which
expanded the federal prohibition on child pornography to images that did not
depict real children. Id. A trade association of businesses involved in the
production and distribution of “adult-oriented materials,” and others, brought a
pre-enforcement challenge, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from these
“virtual” child pornography provisions of the Act, stating that the provisions
chilled protected speech. Id. The District Court for the Northern District of
California disagreed and granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that
speech prohibited by the CPPA’s ban on virtual child pornography is
distinguishable from child pornography, which may be banned without regard to
whether it depicts works of value. Id. It also held that the ban on virtual child
pornography in the CPPA abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial
amount of lawful speech, and thus is overbroad and unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. Id.
39
Id.
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California, asserting that certain provisions of the statute were
overbroad and vague, “chilling them from producing works
protected by the First Amendment.”40 The District Court disagreed,
granting summary judgment to the Government.41 The Court
applied a strict scrutiny standard and held the CPPA did not burden
any more speech than necessary to further “important and
compelling government interests” advanced by the legislation.42
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno,43 agreeing with respondents that the
CPPA was overbroad because it banned material that was neither
obscene under Miller v. California, nor produced by the
exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber.44
According to the Ninth Circuit, the CPPA was unconstitutional
on its face.45 On the other hand, four other Circuit Courts of
Appeals sustained the CPPA.46 These courts, while agreeing that
40

Id. at 243. Plaintiffs in this action consisted of The Free Speech
Coalition, a trade association that defends First Amendment rights against
censorship, the publisher of a book “dedicated to the education and expression
of the ideals and philosophy associated with nudism,” and individual artists
whose work include nude and erotic photographs and paintings. Id. at 234.
Plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the CPPA, alleging that they are vague, overbroad, and constitute
impermissible content-specific regulations and prior restraints on free speech.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 1997 WL 487758 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(noting that among the government’s stated interests is the protection of children
from sexual exploitation). The District Court further stated that any ambiguity in
determining whether an individual depicted in an image “appears to be a minor”
could be “resolved by examining whether the work was marketed and advertised
as child pornography.” Id. According to a strict scrutiny analysis, a challenged
Act must be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.
United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2001).
43
198 F.3d 1083 (1999).
44
Id. at 1092-97.
45
Id. at 1096. “On its face, the CPPA prohibits material that has been
accorded First Amendment protection. That is, non-obscene sexual expression
that does not involve actual children is protected expression under the First
Amendment.” Id.
46
See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
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the CPPA was a “content-based regulation,” found the Act
survived strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to meet
the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from
child pornography offenders and was not unconstitutionally
overbroad or vague.47 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that the CPPA was overbroad and thus violated the
First Amendment.48
B. Early Legislation and Amendments
While the Supreme Court has struggled with addressing which
prohibitions on child pornography the First Amendment allows,
the legislature has sought to deal with the widespread problem of
Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999). The Ninth circuit cited to the First Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68-69 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999), for a proposition upon which it based its holding:
[T]he First Circuit found that the Act at issue was content-based
because it expressly aims to curb a particular category of expression,
child pornography, by singling out the type of expression based on its
content and then banning it. The Hilton court’s determination that
blanket suppression of an entire type of speech is a contentdiscriminating act is a legal conclusion with which we agree. The child
pornography law is at its essence founded upon content-based
classification of speech.
Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1090-91.
47
See Fox, 248 F.3d at 406. The Court stated that, “[n]otwithstanding the
general rule that ‘[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid’ because
of the intolerable ‘risk of suppressing protected expression,’ the Supreme Court
has made clear that in regulating child pornography, Congress is entitled to
‘greater leeway’.” Id. at 400 (citing New York v. Ferber).
48
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002)
(holding “[t]he provision abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount
of lawful speech. For this reason, it is overbroad and unconstitutional”). The
Court stated that, “[e]ven if a film contains no sexually explicit scenes involving
minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and trailers convey
the impression that the scenes would be found in the movie. The determination
turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is depicted.” Id. at 257.
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child pornography itself.49 “Child pornography is a social concern
that has evaded repeated attempts to stamp it out.”50 Congress and
state legislatures have vehemently attempted to enact laws that
would provide support for the prosecution of individuals “involved
in the creation, distribution, and possession of sexually explicit
materials made by or through the exploitation of children.” 51
In 1977, the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act (1977 Act) was enacted as the first federal law to
specifically prohibit the sexual exploitation of children.52 The law
made it illegal to use a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct.53 The creation of the 1977 Act was propelled by

49

See supra Part I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s analysis of various
pornography laws).
50
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (1999).
51
Id. at 1087. Numerous states have enacted criminal statutes prohibiting
the production, promotion, sale, exhibition, or distribution of photographs of
children engaged in sexual activity. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197
(1996); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.455, § 11.61.125 (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3, § 311.11 (West
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1
(West 1996); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (1996); MD. CODE ANN. § 419A (1996);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (Law. Co-op. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 975-33 (1996); MO. REV. STAT. § 573.010 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.03 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 2A:30B-3
(1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.322 (Anderson 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.684 (1995); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6312 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17902 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5a-1 (Vernon 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (Michie 1996); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1994).
52
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1997) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253
(2003)).
53
18 U.S.C. § 2251. The Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other
person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
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congressional findings that child pornography had become a highly
organized multi-million dollar industry in which many children
were exploited through the production of pornography.54 The
legislation was flawed, however, in that federal law enforcement
officials were unable to make practical use of it in prosecuting
offenders.55
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography found
that producers of virtual child pornography primarily employed
models that looked like minors.56 Producers of pornography, in
order to cater to the child pornography market, often used very
“young-looking performers” and models to give viewers the
impression that they were actually looking at minors.57 As a result,
distributors and producers were able to avoid prosecution simply

producing any visual or print medium depicting such conduct, shall be
punished as provided under subsection (c), if such person knows or has
reason to know that such visual or print medium will be transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such visual or print
medium has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce
or mailed. (b) Any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or
control of a minor who knowingly permits such minor to engage in, or
to assist any other person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such
conduct shall be punished as provided under subsection (c) of this
section, if such parent, legal guardian, or person knows or has reason to
know that such visual or print medium will be transported in interstate
or foreign commerce or mailed or if such visual or print medium has
actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
(c) Any person who violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such
person has a prior conviction under this section, such person shall be
fined not more than $15,000, or imprisoned not less than two years nor
more than 15 years, or both.
Id.
54

See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1 (1982).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 596-98 (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT] (detailing findings that child pornography has been used “to lure
children to engage in sexual activity”).
56
Id. at 618.
57
Id.
55
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by claiming ignorance or deception by the performers regarding
their true age.58 This made it impossible, except in the most
obvious cases, to be certain whether the performers really were
under the age of eighteen, resulting in the hindrance of
prosecutions of child pornography offenders.59 Consequently, the
law has been amended several times since it was first enacted.60
As a result of the deficiencies of the 1977 Act and the Ferber
ruling, Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 1984 (1984
Act),61 which incorporated a key phrase from Ferber, stating with
respect to the limits on the classification of child pornography, the
“nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense
be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct.”62 The
statute, as amended, prohibits knowingly mailing or receiving in
the mail any visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually
58

American Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing
to COMMISSION REPORT finding that ambiguity regarding a performer’s true age
“provided an excuse to those in the distribution chain, who could profess
ignorance that they were actually dealing in sexual materials involving
children”).
59
Id. at 89.
60
See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (1999)
(discussing deficiencies in the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act). Only one person was convicted under the Act’s prohibition
against producing pornography. Id. at 1087. In addition, the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act made it a crime for a person to engage
in the distribution for sale of any obscene materials depicting minors engaging
in sexually explicit conduct. Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7, 8 (1978). The
Act defined “minor” as any person under the age of sixteen. Id. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ferber, an individual could be proscribed from
producing or distributing pornographic materials regardless of whether they
were obscene or of value. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753-80 (1982).
Thus, the legislature sought to expand the law’s prohibitions by passing the
Child Protection Act of 1984, which prohibited the distribution of material
depicting sexual activities by children regardless of whether the visual depiction
was “obscene.” See Maria Markova, Comment, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition: The Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to Ban ComputerGenerated Pornography, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 985 (2003); See also 18 U.S.C. §
2251 (2003).
61
Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984).
62
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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explicit conduct.63
Unlike the 1977 Act, the 1984 Act did not require that the
trafficking, receipt, and mailing of child pornography be for the
purposes of sale or distribution for sale.64 By eliminating the
requirement that the production or distribution of child
pornography be for the purpose of sale, the 1984 Act recognized
that a great deal of trafficking in child pornography was not-forprofit.65 Further, the 1984 Act did not require that material be
considered obscene under the Miller obscenity standard before an
individual could be criminally prosecuted for producing,
disseminating or receiving such material.66 The 1984 Act increased
63

18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003). The amended statute provides, in pertinent
part, that an individual is subject to punishment if he or she:
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if—
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is
of such conduct; (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual
depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have
been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by
computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for
distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if—
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is
of such conduct.
Id.
64
Id.
65
See United States v. Andersson, 803 F.2d 903, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that Congress intended to extend coverage of the Act to those
individuals who distributed prohibited materials without commercial motive).
66
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller defined obscenity not
protected by the First Amendment as:
(a) whether the ‘average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest [in sex]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. See also Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. (1984).
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the maximum fines for violation tenfold and stated that child
pornography consisted of visual depictions of children under the
age of eighteen whereas the previous legislation protected children
under the age of sixteen.67
Federal prosecutions “increased dramatically” as a result of the
amended law,68 but the House Judiciary Committee concluded that
the seriousness of child pornography further called for a need to
ban advertisements related to the sexual exploitation of children as
well as a need for greater enforcement of laws that “prohibit the
transportation of minors for purposes of sexual exploitation.”69 As
a result, in 1986, Congress amended the law once more, enacting
the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, which
banned the production and use of advertisements for child
pornography.70
Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act) in its continued efforts to
stop child pornography.71 The law banned the use of computers to
transport, distribute or receive child pornography.72 Congress
passed the law in response to evidence that computer networks
played a substantial role in the exchange of child pornography.73
67

Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. (1984). See also Jannelle E. Pretzer, United
States v. United States District Court (Kantor): Protecting Children from Sexual
Exploitation or Protecting the Pornography Producer?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1343,
1356-57 (1989) (“Raising the age requirement from sixteen to eighteen makes it
easier to prosecute the many cases in which fourteen or fifteen-year-olds have
been sexually exploited, but proof of their age was not available.”).
68
Annemarie J. Mazzone, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from
Sexual Exploitation through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 167, 186 (1994) (explaining that the 1984
revisions allowed federal officials to proceed against noncommercial producers
and distributors).
69
Id. at 186-87.
70
Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2251 (1986)).
71
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251A-2252 (1998)).
72
Id.
73
See generally, Computer Pornography and Child Exploitation Act:
Hearings on S. 1305 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate
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“The main innovation of the 1988 Act was its recordkeeping
requirement,” used to facilitate the enforcement of criminal child
pornography laws.74 Congress’ goal was to compel producers of
sexually explicit images to educate themselves and others about
the ages of the subjects of visual depictions.75 In furtherance of this
goal, the 1988 Act required “all persons producing material
containing visual depictions made after February 6, 1978, showing
actual explicit sexual activity to determine the true age of the
performers, to maintain records containing this information, and to
affix to each copy of the material a statement about where these
records could be found.”76 The records could not be used in
criminal prosecutions.77 Failure to comply with these
recordkeeping requirements, however, gave rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the performers were under the age of eighteen.78
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne,79 holding that
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985); Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act and Pornography Victims Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on
S. 704 and S. 2033 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
(1988).
74
American Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1182 (1992).
Associations representing producers and distributors of books, magazines and
films brought action to challenge the constitutionality of the recordkeeping
provision of the Child Protection and Obscenity Act of 1988. Id. The Court of
Appeals held that claims attacking recordkeeping provisions were mooted by
enactment of new legislation eliminating the recordkeeping provisions of the
Act. Id.
75
Id.
76
18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988).
77
Id.
78
See id. Portions of these recordkeeping provisions were later held
unconstitutional because they burdened “too heavily” the right to produce
material protected by the First Amendment and because they were not “narrowly
tailored” to ban only child pornography. See American Library Ass’n v.
Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The 1990 amendment
incorporated recordkeeping requirements but “significantly altered” the “scope
and burden” of the section’s original recordkeeping requirements. American
Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
79
495 U.S. 103 (1990). See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the Osborne decision and its impact on the state of the law
respecting pornography).
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the First Amendment does not protect child pornography, Congress
enacted the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990 (the 1990 Amendment).80 The 1990
Amendment went further than the 1988 Act and banned the mere
knowing possession of child pornography.81 This version of the
federal child pornography law prohibited an individual from
knowingly receiving or possessing three or more books or films
that have been mailed between states and which contain visual
depictions of a child under the age of eighteen engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.82 In 1994, the 1977 federal law was
again amended to prohibit the production or importation of
sexually explicit depictions of minors.83 The amended law also
provided for mandatory restitution for victims of child
pornography.84
C. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
Notwithstanding its history of amendments and alterations,
child pornography law had yet to face its greatest challenge—the
enactment of prohibitions on the creation and possession of virtual
child pornography.85 Before the CPPA was enacted in 1996,
80

Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 301, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (1990)).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2003). Individuals harmed as a result of the
commission of child pornography were entitled to the “full amount of the
victim’s losses” including any costs incurred by the victim for: (a) medical
services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (b) physical or
occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (c) necessary transportation; temporary
housing; and child care expenses; (d) lost income; (e) attorney’s fees, as well as
other costs incurred; and (f) any other losses suffered by the victim as a
proximate result of the offense. Id.
85
See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that, until the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Congress had
yet to define the problem of child pornography in terms of animated visual
depictions of children). “The actual participation and abuse of children in the
production or dissemination of pornography involving minors was the sine qua
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Congress’ focus on eliminating the problem of child pornography
was limited exclusively to prohibiting the possession or
dissemination of pornography involving real minors.86 The
development of computer-related technology, however, led
Congress to expand child pornography laws to address visual
depictions that appear to be of real children.87
The CPPA expanded the scope of existing federal law to
include “virtual child pornography,” defined as:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct,
where (a) the production of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(b) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (c) such visual
depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or (d) such visual depiction is advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or
contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.88
Because the CPPA included language banning images that “appear
to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,”89 the new
definition of child pornography included all apparent child
pornography, regardless of whether any real children were
involved in its creation.90
The Government, arguing that the CPPA’s ban on virtual child
pornography was constitutional, asserted that its inclusion of an

non of the regulating scheme.” Id. at 1087.
86
See id.
87
See id. (discussing the development of the new law to prevent the use of
technology for “evil” purposes).
88
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (1996).
89
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256 (1996).
90
Id.
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affirmative defense ensured the Act could stand up to a First
Amendment challenge.91 The affirmative defense allowed a
defendant to avoid conviction for nonpossession offenses by
showing that the materials were “produced using only adults and
were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the
impression that they depicted real children.”92 The Ashcroft Court
did not officially rule on the affirmative defense in the Act, but did
point out that the affirmative defense in the Act was incomplete as
well as insufficient.93 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the
affirmative defense could not save the statute from a First
Amendment challenge.94 The provision was incomplete because,
while it allowed a defendant charged with possession to defend on
the ground that the film depicts only adult actors, it did not allow a
defendant charged with distribution of a proscribed work to raise
the same affirmative defense.95 Furthermore, the Court found the
affirmative defense was insufficient because it did not protect
individuals who produced speech solely through the use of
technology and did not use images of adult actors who appeared to
be minors.96 Consequently, a defendant remained open to
prosecution even where he could demonstrate that no children
were harmed in the production of the pornographic images.97
91

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 237 (stating that the
Government’s reliance on the CPPA’s affirmative defense is misplaced). The
Court allows for the possibility that an affirmative defense might in some
circumstances save a statute from a First Amendment challenge. Id. at 256.
Here, the Court stated that the defense is insufficient as it does not apply to
possession or to images created by computer images. Id. As a result, a large
amount of speech unrelated to the Government’s interest in prosecuting
offenders who use images of real children is left unprotected. Id. 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(c) (1996).
92
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
93
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 255-56.
96
Id.
97
Id. The affirmative defense supplies the defendant with an opportunity to
prove that his speech is lawful only where he can establish that the actors used
in the production of the work were adults. Id. The Court also noted that the
CPPA’s affirmative defense was lacking because proving that speech is lawful is
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II. TURNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT “UPSIDE DOWN”: ASHCROFT
V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
When faced with the question whether virtual child
pornography as defined in the CPPA falls outside the protection of
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition answered with a resounding “No.”98 According
to the Court, the CPPA is overbroad because it abridges an
individual’s freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful
speech and thus violates the First Amendment of the
Constitution.99 “The statute proscribes the visual depiction of an
idea—that of minors engaging in sexual activity—that is a fact of
modern society and has been a theme in art and literature
throughout the ages.”100 Thus, the statute prohibits speech despite
its serious literary, political or scientific value.101
a heavy burden and an innocent possessor would most likely have difficulty
proving the age of the actors. Id. Further, even if the defendant himself
possessed the work, the producer himself may not have “preserved the records
necessary to meet the burden of proof.” Id. at 256. See infra Part IV (asserting
that the affirmative defense in the PROTECT Act similarly creates an
unreasonable burden on the defendant).
98
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 234-58. The Free Speech Coalition, a trade
association of businesses involved in the production and distribution of “adult
oriented materials,” and other parties, sought declaratory and injunctive relief by
a pre-enforcement challenge to certain provisions of the CPPA before the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. Id. at 234. The
Government moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition
v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), which reversed the lower court decision.
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court. Id.
99
Id. at 256-58. The First Amendment does not protect all categories of
speech. Id. at 245-46. Defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced with real children may be prohibited without violating the First
Amendment. Id. As the Ashcroft Court stated, though, none of these categories
includes the speech prohibited by the CPPA. Id. at 246.
100
Id. at 246.
101
Id. The Court notes the literary merit of the themes of teenage sexual
activity and the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 248. The Court points to the
works of William Shakespeare as well as to modern Academy Award-nominated
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The Government argued that the possibility of producing
images through the use of computer imaging makes it very difficult
to prosecute those who produce pornography using real children
because experts may have difficulty determining whether the
pictures were made by using real children or computer imaging.102
The necessary solution, the Government continued, is to prohibit
both kinds of images.103 The Government asserted a compelling
interest in ensuring that criminal prohibitions against child
pornography “remain enforceable and effective.”104 The Court
interpreted the Government to be arguing that “protected speech
may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech.”105 The
Court refused to follow this reasoning to uphold the CPPA’s
constitutionality because this analysis, said Justice Kennedy, “turns
the First Amendment upside down.”106 In fact, First Amendment
jurisprudence requires the opposite.107 It is preferable to permit

films like Traffic and American Beauty, both of which depict underage
characters engaging in sexual relations. Id. at 247-48 A single graphic depiction
within such works of sexual activity that “appears to” involve a minor would
subject the possessor to harsh punishment “without inquiry into the work’s
redeeming value”. Id. at 248. The Court stated that:
Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination
with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and literature express the
vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once
knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound,
and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment
are still in reach. Whether or not the films we mention violate the
CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute’s
prohibitions.
Id.
102
Id. at 254-55.
103
Id.
104
See H.R. REP. NO. 107-526, at 2 (2002) (citing legislative findings for
the proposed Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002).
105
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
106
Id. “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to
suppress unlawful speech.” Id. The Court’s analysis rests on the presumption
that virtual child pornography in which no children are directly involved, is
speech entitled to First Amendment protection. Id.
107
Id.
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some unprotected speech to go unpunished than to suppress speech
that should be protected.108 This principle, known as the
overbreadth doctrine, prohibits statutory prohibitions of speech
where “a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or
chilled in the process.”109
Moreover, the Ashcroft Court rejected the Government’s
contention that speech prohibited by the CPPA is “virtually
indistinguishable from material that may be banned under Ferber”
and therefore virtual child pornography should similarly be
proscribed under the First Amendment.110 The Ferber Court
supported its decision to ban child pornography using real children
based on its finding that the acts were “intrinsically related” to the
sexual abuse of children.111 The Ashcroft Court’s ruling was
consistent with the holding in Ferber in that virtual child
pornography, unlike the real child pornography banned in Ferber,
is not “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children.112 The
Court concluded that speech prohibited by the ban on virtual child
pornography in the CPPA is distinguishable from speech
108

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (discussing
application of the overbreadth doctrine). Broadrick involved a class action
brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration that a state
statute regulating political activity by state employees was invalid since it was
impermissibly vague. Id. The Court held that the statute was not substantially
overbroad and thus was not unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 618.
109
See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 844 (1970) (explaining the overbreadth doctrine). For example,
overbreadth attacks have been sustained where the Court believed that rights of
associations were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result
in burdening innocent associations. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612
(1973) (citations omitted).
110
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). See supra Part
I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. Ferber).
111
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). First, child pornography
creates a permanent record of a child’s abuse. Second, since traffic in child
pornography is an economic motive for its production, “the State had an interest
in closing the distribution network.” Id.
112
Id. The Ferber decision, while holding that child pornography is not
protected by the First Amendment, based its decision on the harm suffered by
children during the production of child pornography, rather than on the idea that
such depictions communicate. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
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prohibited by the ban on child pornography under Ferber because
the CPPA prohibits speech “that records no crime and creates no
victims by its production.”113 Virtual child pornography is not
“intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children, according to
the Supreme Court, since any causal link between virtual images
and harm to real children is “contingent and indirect.”114
The Ferber Court not only distinguished between real and
virtual child pornography, it relied on this distinction to support its
holding.115 “Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by
definition without value. The Court recognized that some works in
this category might have significant value,116 but relied on virtual
images—the very images prohibited by the CPPA—as an
alternative and permissible means of expression.”117 Because the
Ferber Court relied on the distinction between real and virtual
child pornography to support its holding, the Ashcroft Court
reasoned that the holding could not be used to support the CPPA,
“a statute that eliminates this distinction.”118
III. TAILORING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS TO MEET

113

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 236.
Id. “The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends
upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.” Id. The Court
disagreed with the government’s argument that virtual child pornography would
result in harm to real children in the form of sexual abuse. Id. This argument is
based on the premise that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illicit conduct.” Id. at 253. The
Court responded that it could not ban virtual child pornography offenses merely
because virtual child pornography may have a tendency to encourage real child
pornography offenses because this comes to close to banning thought rather than
action. Id. See infra Part V (discussing realistic solutions to the problems
associated with the advent and existence of virtual child pornography).
115
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. The Court stated that the “[d]istribution of
descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of
live performances by children retain First Amendment protection.” Id. at 76465.
116
Id. at 761.
117
Id. at 763.
118
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
114
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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
According to the Government, the existence of computergenerated child pornography has already affected its ability to
prosecute child pornography offenders.119 In 1992, federal
prosecutors brought suit against 104 child pornography
offenders.120 Of these prosecutions, 85 defendants pled guilty and
9 cases resulted in a guilty verdict.121 In contrast, data from 1999
shows that of 510 prosecutions, 360 defendants pled guilty and 18
cases resulted in a guilty verdict.122 These statistics show a drop in
the number of guilty pleas as well as a decrease in the number of
successful prosecutions.123
Congressional findings reveal that the vast majority of child
pornography prosecutions today involve images contained on the
defendant’s computer hard drive, computer disk or related
media.124 Congress found that child pornography offenses were
pursued in only the most “clear-cut” cases in which there was
substantial evidence to support the defendant’s guilt.125 To be sure,

119

See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2 (2002) (citing legislative findings of the
adverse impact of the Court’s holding in Ashcroft on the ability to prosecute
offenders used in support of the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention
Act of 2002).
120
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBSCENITY CRIMES, REPORT NO. I-2001-07 (Jul. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT].
121
Id. Nine of these cases were dismissed. Id.
122
Id. Thirty of these cases were dismissed. Id.
123
See id.
124
H.R. 4623, at § 2 (2002).
125
Pub. L. 108-21, Title V, § 501, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 676. Evidence
submitted to the Congress, including evidence from the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates that “technology already exists to
disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make
depictions of real children appear computer generated.” Id. The technology will
soon exist, if it does not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real.
Congress found that: “The vast majority of child pornography prosecutions
today involve images contained on computer hard drives, computer disks, and/or
related media,” id.; “technological advances since Ferber have led many
criminal defendants to suggest that the images of child pornography they
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the primary reasons reported by prosecutors for deciding not to
prosecute a case involving child pornography included weak
evidence (22.9 percent), lack of evidence (11.7 percent) and lack
of evidence that a federal crime has been committed (11.5
percent).126
Data provided by law enforcement agents shows that when a
child pornographer is arrested, he usually has in his possession a
collection of child pornography either in hard copies or loaded on
computer disks.127 Problems prosecuting offenders often arise due
to the difficulty or impossibility of identifying the children who
participated in the production of the pornography where
technology has been used to alter images.128 Further, computer
technology may make it impossible to identify whether an image

possess are not those of real children, insisting that the government prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are not computer-generated,” id.;
“[s]uch challenges will likely increase after the Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition decision,” id.; “[c]hild pornography circulating on the Internet has, by
definition, been digitally uploaded or scanned into computers and has been
transferred over the Internet, often in different file formats, from trafficker to
trafficker,” id.; “[a]n image seized from a collector of child pornography is
rarely a first-generation product, and the retransmission of images can alter the
image so as to make it difficult for even an expert conclusively to opine that a
particular image depicts a real child. If the original image has been scanned from
a paper version into a digital format, this task can be even harder since proper
forensic delineation may depend on the quality of the image scanned and the
tools used to scan it,” id.; “[t]he impact on the government’s ability to prosecute
child pornography offenders is already evident. The Ninth Circuit has seen a
significant adverse effect on prosecutions since the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition.” Id.
126
DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 120.
127
See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearings on S.1237
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1996).
128
See Lydia W. Lee, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996:
Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639,
676 (1999) (pointing out that enforcement of existing child pornography laws
would be “nearly impossible” if virtual child pornography is left outside the
scope of criminal liability because the average viewer would be unable to
distinguish between real and virtual child pornography). The average viewer
includes the child-victim, perpetrator, police, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Id.
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of a real child was used in the creation of child pornography.129
Developments in computer technology that make virtual and
real child pornography virtually indistinguishable have led to the
creation of a good faith or reasonable doubt defense in the
enforcement of child pornography laws.130 As a result, criminal
defendants who might easily have been prosecuted in the past
evade conviction by creating a reasonable doubt as to their guilt
where they claim that their conduct merely involved virtual child
pornography and not a real child.131 For example, in United States
v. Kimbrough, the defense introduced expert witness testimony that
computers could be used to generate pictures of children that were
undetectably identical to actual child pornography.132 This ability
could have created a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind about
whether the pictures in the defendant’s possession were real.133
129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
132
69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995). Kimbrough was convicted of two counts of
receipt of child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography.
Id. at 735. His conviction was reversed in part and remanded for the trial court
to vacate Kimbrough’s conviction and to resentence him within the trial court’s
discretion. Id. at 730. The court required that a jury find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Kimbrough knew the images in his possession involved real children.
Id. at 733. Kimbrough was ultimately convicted. Id. at 737. See John P.
Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child
Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 220 (2003) (arguing that the
“virtual child” defense has not been a successful one for defendants, contrary to
the government’s assertions).
133
Id. See United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2002)
(after the decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, court entertained
motion to reconsider previously denied motion for judgment of acquittal;
judgment of acquittal was granted with respect to one set of images in which the
government had no evidence other than the images themselves); United States v.
Bunnell, 2002 WL 927765 (D. Me. 2002) (after the Ashcroft case was decided,
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea granted); United States v. Reilly,
2002 WL 31307170 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (after Ashcroft, defendant’s motion to
withdraw guilty plea granted. The court held that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the images depicted real
children).
130
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Congressional findings suggest that prosecutors, having
difficulty prosecuting offenders, are bringing cases against
individuals only where they can specifically identify the child
depicted or where the image originated.134 The Government
utilized these findings as support for proposed legislation, the
Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Acts of 2002 and
2003,135 as well as for the newly enacted the PROTECT Act.136
The COPPA of 2002 of 2003137 were the subject of criticism
134

See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2 (2002). The National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children testified at Congressional hearings that
prosecutors around the country have expressed concern about whether
previously indicted cases will continue to be viable. Id. They also expressed
concern about whether potentially meritorious prosecutions will decline as a
result of the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Free
Speech Coalition. See id. Other Congressional findings include the following:
(1) Obscenity and child pornography are not entitled to protection
under the First Amendment and thus may be prohibited; (2) The
Government has a compelling state interest in protecting children and
those who sexually exploit them, including both child molesters and
child pornographers; (3) The Government has a compelling interest in
ensuring that the criminal prohibitions against child pornography
remain enforceable and effective; (4) In 1982, when the Supreme Court
decided Ferber, the technology did not exist to (a) create depictions of
virtual children that are indistinguishable from depictions of real
children, (b) create depictions of virtual children using compositions of
real children to create an unidentifiable child, or (c) disguise pictures of
real children being abused by making the image look computer
generated.
Id.
135
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); H.R. 1161, 108th Cong.
(2003). The proposed bills stated that child pornography exists by means of:
[a]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture,
or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually
explicit conduct, where: Such visual depiction is a computer image or
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2.
136
See S.151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
137
The COPPA of 2002 was passed by the House of Representatives by a
413-8 vote. See David L. Hudson, A First Amendment Focus: Reflecting on the
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because, like the CPPA, they criminalized virtual child
pornography offenses.138 Neither proposed Act was enacted into

Virtual Child Porn Decision, J. MARSHALL L. REV. 211, 217 (2002).
Subsequently, the President called upon the Senate to pass the legislation. See
Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the
PROTECT Act, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3 (analyzing the PROTECT Act,
Congress’ latest legislative response to the problem of child pornography).
However, differences between the COPPA of 2002 and the Senate version of
this bill passed in November of 2003 could not be reconciled before the
conclusion of the 107th Congress and the COPPA was never enacted into law. Id
Undeterred by the failure of the 2002 Act, the House passed the COPPA of 2003
on March 27, 2003. H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). Testimony in support of the
bill states that the COPPA of 2003 is “closely modeled” on the COPPA of 2002.
The Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography
Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate
Deputy Attorney General), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/collins
031103.htm. As such, the Act retained its proscription against virtual child
pornography in its continued effort to protect the interests of child pornography
victims. See H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). The COPPA of 2003 contains a
revised version of § 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA. Id. The House replaced the
“appears to be” language with the words “is, or is indistinguishable from.” Id.
Second, the COPPA of 2003 removes § 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA, the
subparagraph which contained the term “conveys the impression.” Id. By
striking this provision, Congress removes the prohibition on material that “is
advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” See id. Instead, the proposed Act
provided that producers and distributors may not knowingly suggest that
material portrays a minor engaging in sexually explicit material. Id. In effect,
this incorporates a mens rea requirement into the statute in an attempt to remedy
the Ashcroft Court’s concern regarding the overbreadth of this section of the
CPPA. See id. In addition, the COPPA of 2003 included an affirmative defense
which modifies the affirmative defense in the CPPA. Id. Under the affirmative
defense provision, a defendant would be absolved of liability if he could show
that the image for which he was arrested did not implicate a real child. Id. They
could do this by establishing that either an adult or computer-generated image
was used in the production of the alleged child pornography. Id.
138
See Sara C. Marcy, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is There Any
Way Around Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N. CAR. L. REV. 2136
(2003) (citing criticisms of the COPPA of 2002 and 2003).
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law; However, Congress ultimately incorporated provisions from
the COPPA of 2002 and 2003 into the PROTECT Act.139 As such,
the controversy surrounding virtual child pornography continues
with respect to the current law.140
According to its supporters, the PROTECT Act addresses the
difficulty prosecutors have had in the wake of the Ashcroft
decision by attempting to “[s]trengthen the laws against child
pornography in ways that can survive constitutional review.”141
The PROTECT Act seeks to address the Ashcroft Court’s concerns
about the unconstitutionality of the CPPA.142 The PROTECT Act,
like the COPPA, amends the CPPA in an attempt to meet the
standards of the First Amendment.143
Specifically, the law amends section 2256(8)(B) of the
CPPA,144 replacing the constitutionally deficient “appears to be”
language with the words “indistinguishable from.”145 Specifically,
the Act bans “Obscene Child Pornography,” defined as “a visual
depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or
painting” that depicts an actual minor or image that “appears to be
of a minor” engaging in “graphic” sexual activity and “lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”146 This
139

Doug Isenberg, The Wrong Answer to Child Porn on the Net, CNET
News.com, May 15, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/2010-1071_31001105.html (stating that the Act “has received widespread publicity for its
coordination of nationwide efforts to locate missing children and their
abductors, an effort that has gained momentum thanks in part to the work of Ed
Smart, father of formerly missing Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth Smart”).
140
Marcy, supra note 138, at 2153.
141
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT, available at
http:///www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/ 03_ag_266.htm.
142
See id.
143
See Marcy, supra note 138, at 2152 (discussing provisions of the
PROTECT Act in light of the Supreme Court’s concerns in Ashcroft).
144
18 U.S.C. § 2256 (West 2000).
145
Pub. L 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650; 18 U.S.C. 2256(8). The
PROTECT Act expands the definition of “child pornography” to include a
digital images, computer images or computer-generated images that are
indistinguishable from minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id.
Indistinguishable is defined as “virtually indistinguishable.” Id.
146
18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2)-(b)(2). The Act defines “graphic” images as
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definition necessarily includes images which are not created with
the use of real children.147
In addition, the PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, incorporates
a knowledge requirement.148 Thus, a person is in violation of the
Act if he or she knowingly
[R]eproduces any child pornography for distribution
through the mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including computer or advertises, promotes,
presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or in
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, any material or purported material in a manner
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another
to believe, that the material or purported material is, or
contains (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual
depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.149
Significantly, the PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, places the
burden of proof on the defendant to prove that the images did not
depict real children, rather than requiring prosecutors to prove that
the images were made from images of real children.150 In
those that are or appear to be of a minor “engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic
or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oralgenital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex.” Id.
147
See id.
148
§ 504(a), 117 Stat. at 680-81; Marcy, supra note 138, at 2153.
149
§ 504(a), 117 Stat. at 680-81.
150
Id. A defendant might meet the affirmative defense by establishing the
identity or existence of the actors used to create the pornography. See Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives on H.R. 1104 and H.R.
1161, Mar. 11, 2003 , available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
judiciary/hju85642.000/hju85642_0f.htm (citing Honorable Robert C. Scott’s
position with respect to the affirmative defense in the COPPA of 2003 that the
“Government raises serious constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on
the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not lawful”). The Honorable
Robert Scott points out that:
Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no
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promulgating this affirmative defense, Congress contends that the
Supreme Court in Ashcroft left open the possibility that, had the
existing affirmative defense been more complete, the 1996 statute
might have survived a constitutional challenge, even if it was
overbroad.151 The affirmative defense allows a defendant to show
that “the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct and each
such person was an adult at the time the material was produced,”
or that “the alleged child pornography was not produced using any
actual minor or minors.”152
IV. FACING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHY LAWS PROSCRIBING
VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT
The prohibitions on virtual child pornography contained in the

way of establishing the identity or even the existence of the actors, and
if the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the Government, as it
asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the innocent possessor.
Id. Under the PROTECT Act, it is an affirmative defense that:
The alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or
persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and each person was an
adult at the time the material was produced; or the alleged child
pornography was not produced using any actual minor or minors.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2) (2002).
151
See id; see also Jason Baruch, Case Comment, Constitutional Law:
Permitting Virtual Child Pornography—A First Amendment Requirement, Bad
Policy, or Both?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1073 (2003). Baruch explains that:
Even if the Government were to prosecute parties uttering protected
speech, courts generally do, on a “case-by-case analysis,” correct the
misapplication of an overbroad statute. A fortiori, the CPPA provides
defendants with an affirmative defense that facilitates such correction.
Id. at 1087.
152
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(1)(A), (B); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2). See also
John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child
Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205 (2003). The PROTECT Act also
incorporates the COPPA of 2003’s requirement that the defendant give notice to
the prosecution that it will raise the affirmative defense so as to prevent “unfair
surprise” at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.
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PROTECT Act are constitutionally deficient and should be struck
down under the First Amendment.153 Actual child pornography is,
without question, not constitutionally protected speech.154 On the
other hand, sexually explicit material that does not involve actual
children does not fall within the definition of “child
pornography.”155 The Ashcroft Court struck down the CPPA on the
fact that it was overbroad because it criminalized speech that was
not obscene and did not involve real children.156 The PROTECT
Act suffers from the same fatal flaw as the CPPA: The bill is
similarly overbroad in that it bans innocent speech and works of
literary, artistic or political merit in an effort to proscribe virtual
child pornography.157
To be sure, while the Act amends the CPPA, replacing the
constitutionally-deficient “appears to be” language, the language
inserted in its place is similarly inconsistent with the First
Amendment.158 The PROTECT Act makes illegal the possession
or distribution of computer images or computer-generated images
that are, or are indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.159 The words “indistinguishable from”
create the same problem from a constitutional standpoint as the
words “appears to be” because they prohibit what the Supreme
Court held could not be prohibited—the creation of virtual images
that do not implicate or harm children.160
As a result of the overbreadth of the statutory language, artists
and filmmakers would remain vulnerable to prosecution where
they create artistic works without the use of actual children.161 The
Court in Ashcroft unambiguously held that a defendant could not
153

Pub. L. No. 108-21.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
155
See id.
156
See supra Part I (discussing the Ashcroft Court’s holding that
pornography which does not involve real children could not be proscribed by the
CPPA).
157
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
158
18 U.S.C. § 2252(A); Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 218.
159
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (1996).
160
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
161
Id. at 246-47.
154
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be convicted for creating images that do not involve real
children.162 The virtual child pornography provisions of the
PROTECT Act will fail on the same ground as the CPPA failed in
Ashcroft—the Act punishes a defendant where no real children are
implicated or harmed.163
In support of legislation banning virtual child pornography,
Congress seems to assert that the Ashcroft Court did not consider
the harm that would occur to real children when technology makes
it impossible to distinguish real children from virtual children.164
An examination of the Ashcroft opinion, however, reveals that the
Court did consider this issue and found that the argument
nevertheless did not provide support for the prohibition against
virtual child pornography.165 In response to the Government’s
assertion that virtual images promote trafficking in works produced
through the exploitation of real children, the Court stated that
“[t]he hypothesis is somewhat implausible. If virtual images were
identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be
driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if
fictional, computerized images would suffice.”166
Furthermore, it is unlikely the affirmative defense included in
the PROTECT Act will save the PROTECT Act from a
constitutional challenge because it imposes too heavy a burden on
defendants.167 The government’s arguments in support of the
162

See id. The Court in Ashcroft stated, “the CPPA prohibits speech that
records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children . . . .”
Id.
163
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the unconstitutional
provision of the COPPA which proscribed virtual child pornography).
164
See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 7-13 (2002) (asserting the need for
legislation proscribing virtual child pornography). “Child pornography—virtual
or otherwise—is detrimental to the nation’s most precious and vulnerable
asset—our children. Regardless of the method of its production, child
pornography is used to promote and incite deviant and dangerous behavior in
our society.” Id. at 12.
165
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253.
166
Id. at 254.
167
Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 223.
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affirmative defense assert that requiring the state to identify
whether an image is graphic or a real photograph places an
unrealistic burden on prosecutors.168 But if this argument stands,
and if requiring the government to identify the children in alleged
pornographic materials is an impossible burden to meet, the logical
conclusion is that requiring a defendant to establish the identity of
the children in such images is similarly unreasonable.169 The Court
in Ashcroft, while leaving the door open to the possibility that an
affirmative defense could save the CPPA, was very clear that the
evidentiary burden at hand was not a “trivial” one.170 According to
the Court, “if the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the
Government, as it asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the
innocent possessor.”171 The Court further stated that
[t]he Government raises serious constitutional difficulties
by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of
proving his speech is not unlawful. An affirmative defense
applies only after prosecution has begun, and the speaker
168

See id. at 242. Even some supporters of the COPPA of 2003 concede
that Prosecutors’ hands are not entirely tied by the Ashcroft decision. According
to Associate Deputy General Daniel Collins:
Prosecutors have several potential avenues for proving that a child
depicted in an image is real. First, prosecutors might know the identity
of a particular child depicted in an image from another child sex abuse
situation. Second, prosecutors might be able to establish that a given
image predates the technology at issue. Third, prosecutors might be
able to present expert testimony that a given image likely depicts a real
child.
The Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography
Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate
Deputy
Attorney
General),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/collins031103.htm.
169
See Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 225. “If the government, with its
seemingly infinite resources, is purportedly having trouble proving that a
depiction is that of a real minor, then how can criminal defendants, many of
whom are indigent, be expected to do so?” Id.
170
Ascroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
171
Id. at 255-56.
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must himself prove, on pain of a felony conviction, that his
conduct falls within the affirmative defense.172
This burden shifting creates constitutional due process
concerns.173 Due process requires that the prosecution prove each
and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.174
Shifting the burden to the defendant to show that images that are
indistinguishable from or appear to be actual minors do not involve
real children creates a constitutionally impermissible presumption
that the defendant was in possession of real child pornography
images in the first place.175 The affirmative defense would allow a
defendant to rebut this presumption.176 It is the presumption itself,
however, that is problematic from a constitutional standpoint
because it “relieves the government of its burden of proof on an
essential element of the case”—namely that the images themselves
depict real child pornography.177
If the PROTECT Act comes before the Supreme Court on a
constitutional challenge, the Court, following the Ashcroft holding,
will likely conclude that the amended Act is similarly flawed with
respect to the affirmative defense.178 Congress’ attempt to remedy
the affirmative defense by stipulating that it applies to possession
as well as to production and distribution of child pornography fails
to protect individuals who create images in which no children were
harmed.179
V. WHERE CONGRESS GETS IT RIGHT: VIABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEM OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Child pornography “abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest

172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 255.
Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Marcy, supra note 138, at 2146.
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and most vulnerable members of our society.”180 The harms
associated with the creation and distribution of child pornography
are tremendous, both in nature and in scope.181 The children used
to create child pornography suffer direct emotional and
psychological problems.182 Furthermore, child pornography creates
a record that could potentially exist forever, thereby deepening the
harm associated with the crime.183 Moreover, sexual abusers may
use already-created visual depictions to ensure that their victims
will remain quiet about the exploitation.184 Offenders further
perpetuate the cycle of child pornography by luring other children
into modeling for them by using the images of other children to
work a “peer pressure” approach on their prospective victims.185
In enacting the CPPA of 1996, Congress recognized that
pedophiles and sexual abusers use child pornography as a way “to
stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.”186 Thus, the
significance of the effort to ban child pornography is heightened
180

S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12 (1996).
See id. (discussing the role of child pornography in the cycle of child
abuse and exploitation); Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual Antithesis, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2783, 2785 (2001) (noting that the “harms associated with child pornography are
as varied as they are egregious”).
182
See Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2785.
183
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982). Because child
pornography creates an enduring record, it poses “an even greater threat to the
child victim.” Id. “A child who has posed for a camera must go through life
knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for
child pornography.” Id. In addition, “[t]he victim’s knowledge of publication of
the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the
child.” Id.
184
Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2786.
185
Id. The “peer pressure” consists of seven stages: (1) showing child
pornography to a child for “educational purposes”; (2) attempting to persuade
the child that sexual activity is permitted and even pleasurable; (3) convincing
the child that because his peers engage in sexual activity, such activity is
acceptable; (4) desensitizing the child and lowering the child’s inhibitions; (5)
engaging the child in sexual activity; (6) photographing such sexual activity; and
(7) using the resulting child pornography to “attract and seduce yet more child
victims.” Id.
186
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 13 (1996).
181
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due to the stimulating effect such materials have on those who
view it.187 Criminal investigations have shown that almost all
pedophiles collect child pornography, which may escalate their
addiction and desensitize them to its deviant nature.188
According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, child pornography prosecutions have increased an
average of 10 percent per year every year since 1995.189 The
government’s concern that the legality of virtual child pornography
will stifle prosecutors in their effort to prosecute offenders of real
child pornography laws is not without merit.190 First, there is
Congress’ finding that, after the Ninth Circuit decision in Free
Speech Coalition, prosecutions are increasingly being brought only
in the most clear-cut cases.191 The Ninth Circuit’s decision also
resulted in the release from prison of a man who pled guilty to
possessing 2,600 images of child pornography.192 He was freed
after a judge ruled that the state’s law was unconstitutional because
it failed to distinguish between real and virtual pornography.193
As the history of efforts to ban real child pornography

187

See id.
Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2786.
189
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
available at http://www.missingkids. com (2004).
190
See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 7 (2002).
191
Id.
192
See People v. Alexander, 791 N.E.2d 506 (S.Ct. Ill. 2003). Kenneth
Alexander was charged under Illinois state law with 45 counts of child
pornography. Id. He successfully challenged the law, whose definition of child
pornography included virtual images, arguing that it was overbroad and thus
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 511-12. See also Jan LaRue, Supreme
Court Rules First Amendment Protects “Virtual” Child Porn, (Aug. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=2044&department=
CWA&categoryid=pornography. Kenneth Alexander was awaiting sentencing
and faced up to 15 years in prison because police found close to 2,600 images of
children engaging in lewd behavior with other children, adults and animals in
his computer at his residence. Id. His attorney, Donald Morrison of Waukegan,
however, challenged the state law to which Alexander pled guilty to on March
28, citing the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.
Id.
193
Id.
188
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demonstrates, prohibitions on virtual child pornography will
require continued amendments to bring the laws in harmony with
the First Amendment.194 Unfortunately, resources and time spent
by the government on passing constitutionally-suspect legislation
diverts resources that can otherwise produce visible results in the
fight against child pornography. Legislative attempts at proscribing
virtual child pornography, instead of combating child pornography,
will harm efforts to prosecute individuals who exploit real children
by directing federal resources towards the constitutionally difficult
task of prosecuting individuals who create or possess computer
generated images.195 Rather than attempting to ban virtual child
pornography, the government should strengthen other areas that
would allow for more effective prosecution of offenders.
First, federal funds should be allocated to programs such as the
FBI Innocent Images Initiative, which identifies and investigates
194

See supra Part I.B (detailing changes in the law respecting
pornography). The history of efforts to ban real child pornography is exhibited
in the numerous amendments to the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
195
A dialogue with ACLU member Nadine Strossen about the COPPA of
2002 illustrates this dilemma:
QUESTION: Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the Child Pornography Prevention Act, which regulated so-called
virtual child pornography, as fatally overboard. Congress responded by
immediately going back to the drawing board to craft a supposedly
more precise version of the CPPA called the Child Obscenity and
Pornography Prevention Act of 2002. Is Congress wasting its time here,
and, by extension, wasting taxpayers’ dollars, in attempting to regulate
fake child pornography?
RESPONSE: I admit I don’t know what the provisions of this new law
are. If they are still dealing with what Justice Kennedy’s opinion
correctly analogized to a thought crime, then we’re exactly in that area
that I just talked about where protection is absolute. I would defend
somebody’s right to look at any image that does not involve the use of
an actual child no matter how realistic it is. If that’s what the new law
is criminalizing, I think the Supreme Court’s rationale is going to
extend to that legislation.
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of
Expression: A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO.
MAS. UNIV. CIV. RTS. L. J., 185, 222-23 (2003).
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individuals who use the Internet to exploit children.196 The
Initiative reports that, throughout the FBI, there was a 1,280%
increase in the number of child pornography cases opened between
fiscal years 1996 and 2001.197 The organization anticipates that the
number of cases opened and the amount of resources utilized to
address the crime problem will continue to rise during the next
several years.198 Recently, in March of 2002, the Initiative
undertook “Operation Candyman,” in which it invested a great deal
of time and energy to investigate an “Electronic Group”
(“Egroup”), a “community” of people communicating via the
Internet.199 An undercover agent uncovered three Yahoo! Egroups
involved in posting, exchanging and transmitting child
pornography.200 One website depicted the Egroup as a group “for
people who love kids.”201 Subpoenas were issued on Internet
providers for the addresses of individuals who frequented these
sites.202 Information on approximately 1,400 subjects was
provided, and at least eighty individuals have been charged.203

196

FBI INNOCENT IMAGES INITIATIVE, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq
/cid/cac/innocent.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The Innocent Images initiative
is composed of 23 task forces in 56 FBI field offices around the country, their
purpose is to “investigate and eradicate online sexual exploitation of children
and the production and distribution of child pornography.” Id. available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel102/cm 031802.htm.
197
FBI INNOCENT IMAGES INITIATIVE available at http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/pressrel102/cm031802. htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The number of
child pornography cases opened increased from 113 in 1996 to 1,159 in 2001.
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. As of March 18, 2002, over 266 searches had been conducted.
Twenty seven people had been arrested and admitted to the prior molestation of
over 36 children. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PRESS RELEASE,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel/candyman/candymanhome.
htm.
201
The group also stated, “You can post any type of messages you like too
or any type of pics and vids you like too. P.S. IF WE ALL WORK TOGETHER
WE WILL HAVE THE BEST GROUP ON THE NET.” Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
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Moreover, the Justice Department should increase funding for
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Forces, a department
that assists state and local authorities in combating child sexual
exploitation. 204 Since 1998, the Task Forces have helped train
more than 1,500 prosecutors and 1,900 investigators, and have
provided direct investigative assistance in more than 3,000 cases
involving individuals who allegedly use the Internet to perpetuate
child pornography crimes.205 President George W. Bush has
already pledged to increase efforts to expand the investigation and
“vigorous prosecution of child exploitation on the Internet.”206 The
executive branch seeks to increase funding in furtherance of such
efforts.207 Congress should support such efforts, both financially
and vocally, in order to strengthen efforts to prosecute child
pornography offenders.
In addition, as designated in the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 2002, resources should be allocated to: (1) create an FBI
database of images already known to be of real children, thereby
facilitating the prosecution of others found to have those images;
(2) encourage greater voluntary reporting of suspected child
pornography found by Internet companies; and (3) strengthen
enhanced penalties for repeat offenders. 208
The creation of an FBI database would answer Congress’
concerns with respect to the increased difficulties faced by the
government in prosecuting child pornography offenders.209
Evidence submitted to Congress, including testimony from the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates
that technology already exists to disguise depictions of real
children to make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of
204

THE WHITE HOUSE, Increasing Online Safety for America’s Children,
Press Release (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/10/20021023.html.
205
See id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See H.R. REP. No. 107-526 (2002). In addition to banning virtual child
pornography, the COPPA of 2003 would also provide for an FBI database and
encourage greater voluntary reporting by Internet companies. Id.
209
Id. at 7-13.
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real children appear computer-generated.210 The inability of
prosecutors to identify the children who participate in the
production of pornography allows criminal defendants who would
have been easily prosecuted in the past to go free based on their
claims that no real children were used in the production of the
pornography.211
The COPPA of 2002 included a provision for the creation of a
database where images known to be of real children would be
compiled.212 Such a database would ease prosecutions of child
pornography offenders by refuting the “reasonable doubt”
argument, i.e. that the images they possessed, distributed or created
did not utilize real children.213 Images found in the possession of
offenders could be matched up with those in the database to
determine if any of the children’s photos match those of the
“virtual” children.214 Efforts to create such a database are being
hindered. Consequently, in a futile effort to ban virtual child
pornography, Congress has impeded a portion of the Act that is
likely to be of great practical use in prosecuting offenders. Rather
than continuing to incorporate viable solutions within otherwise
constitutionally faulty legislation, Congress should pass separate
legislation that creates an FBI database and includes provisions
designed to encourage greater reporting of suspected child
pornography.
Congress has also begun to address concerns about the lack of
reporting of child pornography offenses.215 Part of the problem is
the fact that children who are sexually victimized—in part due to
intimidation by the individuals who exploit them—are not likely to
report the exploitation.216 The CPPA of 1996 required
210

See id.
See supra Part II (discussing the Ashcroft decision as well as the
government’s concerns that the decision will make it difficult, if not impossible,
to prosecute child pornography offenders in the wake of virtual child
pornography technology).
212
See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
213
See id.
214
See id.
215
See H.R. REP. No. 107-526 (2002).
216
See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
211
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communications providers to report to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) knowledge of facts or
circumstances of potential sexual exploitation crimes against
children.217 A provider of electronic communication services could
be fined for knowingly and willfully failing to make a report.218
The NCMEC was to forward the reports to law enforcement
agencies designated by the Attorney General.219
Congress stated in its legislative findings that the COPPA of
2002 strengthens this reporting system by adding the new offenses
under sections 1466A and 1466B—the sections of the Act
proscribing virtual child pornography.220 Since the Act never went
into effect, though, neither did the purported “stronger reporting
system.” A more effective avenue to strengthen the reporting
system in the 1996 Act would be to work closely with the NCMEC
to encourage greater voluntary reporting of child pornography
offenses by informing electronic communication service providers
of their legal duty to report such offenses.221 To ensure and
maximize the effectiveness and impact of such legislation, this
legal duty should be addressed in a bill separate from any

available at http://www.missingkids.com. “A major step to eliminating child
pornography is to make people knowledgeable of both federal and state laws
regarding the definitions and criminal implications of child pornography. In
doing so, the general public can become more responsive to the issue and report
violations to the appropriate officials.” Id.
217
H.R. REP. 107-526. The 1996 Act incorporated this as a legal duty. 18
U.S.C. § 2251 (1996).
218
18 U.S.C. § 2251.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
42 U.S.C. § 13032(b) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6) (2003). Pursuant
to the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, anyone
engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a remote
computing service to the public must report “knowledge of facts or
circumstances” from which a violation of child pornography laws is apparent to
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and the FBI
or U.S. Customs Service. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6). Such a report must be made
“as soon as reasonably possible” after obtaining knowledge and should include
“whatever information . . . that led it to conclude that a violation of federal child
pornography statutes” had occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b).
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legislation that seeks to criminalize virtual child pornography
offenses. Therefore, if a bill prohibiting virtual child pornography
is defeated as unconstitutional or held up in a battle over its
constitutionality, legislation will still exist to criminalize the failure
of electronic communication service providers to report child
pornography offenses.
A possible method for progress in this area would be to make
service providers aware of the ease by which they may report
offenses to the NCMEC’s CyberTipline, launched on March 9,
1998.222 The tip line serves as a national online clearinghouse for
investigative leads and tips regarding child sexual exploitation.223
The NCMEC has received and processed over 120,000 leads
through the Cyber Tipline, at least half of which were reports of
child pornography, resulting in hundreds of arrests and successful
prosecutions.224 In light of the Cyber Tipline’s success, Congress
should attempt to direct resources to assisting the NCMEC.
Furthermore, in light of the limited federal resources available to
investigate child pornography, Congress should expand the scope
of investigators to include state and local law enforcement,
provided that a proper system is implemented to facilitate the
exchange of information between law enforcement on both state
and federal levels.225
222

THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Cyber
Tipline Information and Success Stories, at http://www.missingkids.com
/missingkids/ (2004).
223
Id. The NCMEC’s CyberTipline is linked via server to the FBI,
Customs Service and Postal Inspection Service. Id. Leads are received and
reviewed by NCMEC’s analysts, who visit the reported sites, examine and
evaluate the content, use search tools to try to identify perpetrators, and provide
all lead information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and investigator.
Id. Both the FBI and Customs Service have assigned agents who work directly
out of the NCMEC, and review reports. Id.
224
CYBER TIPLINE, Campaign Overview, at http://www.cybertipline.com/
missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry= en_US&PageId=1230.
225
See COMBATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives, (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03272.pdf
(providing
information
on
coordination of federal efforts to combat child pornography).
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Finally, the government should take steps to inform both
parents and children about child pornography so that both are
encouraged to report offenses more extensively.226 “Computer
telecommunications have become one of the most prevalent
techniques used by pedophiles to share illegal photographic images
of minors and to lure children into illicit sexual relationships.”227
According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, children who view child pornography begin to view
pornographic acts as acceptable and normal.228 This acceptance
may decrease the likelihood that they will report such offenses.229
If children are made more knowledgeable about what it means to
be solicited on the Internet, they will more likely speak up about
such incidents.230 In the same respect, if parents are made more
knowledgeable about federal and state laws regarding the
definitions and criminal implications of child pornography, they
will more likely be responsive to the issue and report such offenses
to the appropriate authorities.231

226

See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ONLINE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY:
INNOCENT IMAGES NATIONAL INITIATIVE, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/
innocent.htm (last visited, Oct. 30, 2003).
228
NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Child
Pornography Background, at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet
/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageID=1198 (last visited Oct. 30,
2003).
229
Statistics have yet to be released to illustrate the decline in the number
of successful prosecutions after the CPPA’s ban on virtual child pornography
was overturned.
230
NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Campaign
Against Child Sexual Exploitation, at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/
servlet/CampaignServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId= 1246 (last visited
Jan. 9, 2004). One of the campaign’s messages states: “The Sound A Child
Makes When Sexually Assaulted is Usually Silence.” The campaign encourages
parents to be proactive in detecting and preventing child sexual exploitation and
in educating their children about sexual exploitation in order to encourage
reporting of such offenses.
231
Id.
227
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CONCLUSION
It is too soon to determine the extent virtual child pornography
will affect the government’s ability to prosecute child pornography
offenders. Unfortunately, the scenario envisioned by prosecutors,
in which a defendant in possession of child pornography can
escape liability by asserting that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images they possess, create or
distribute are derived from real children, is already a reality.232 The
fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court has stated that child
pornography may be proscribed only where a real child is involved
and where the welfare of real children is primarily in the
balance.233 The COPPA of 2002 and 2003 and the ban on virtual
child pornography in the PROTECT ACT suffer from a fatal flaw
in that their prohibitions on virtual child pornography do not solely
implicate real children.234 As such, Congress faces the tremendous
and arguably insurmountable obstacle of tailoring virtual child
pornography laws to meet constitutional standards. Particularly in
light of the problems in the numerous statutes enacted over the last
decade, Congress should focus its resources on alternative viable
solutions to the problems created by virtual child pornography in
order to strengthen the case against offenders of actual child
pornography.

232

See supra Part III (pointing to cases in which prosecutors are having
difficulty prosecuting cases where defendants assert that the images they
allegedly possessed or distributed did not implicate real children).
233
See supra Part II (discussing the Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
decision and its implications with respect to virtual child pornography laws).
234
See supra Part IV (analyzing the constitutionality of these recent
legislative attempts).

